From a Kantian perspective, why is lying or withholding information considered impermissible?

• A. Lying or withholding information uses people as a means to an end and violates autonomy.
• B. Therapeutic privilege is never allowed, but a waiver is autonomous.
• C. Deception can be justified if it benefits society.
• D. Consent is only a recommendation, not a requirement.

Answer: (A)

In Kantian ethics, two ideas matter: treat people as ends in themselves and only act according to maxims you could will to become universal laws. Lying or withholding information violates both. When you lie, you present a falsehood as if it were true to someone else, effectively manipulating their beliefs to get your way. If everyone’s maxims about truth-telling were universalized, trustworthy communication would break down, and promises or statements would lose force. That makes deception incoherent as a moral rule. More fundamentally, lying uses the other person as a means to your own ends rather than respecting them as a rational agent with the capacity to decide for themselves, which violates their autonomy.

Withholding information can be just as harmful in Kantian terms, because it blocks the other person’s ability to make an informed, autonomous choice. Truth-telling is a duty, and concealing information without a universally acceptable, rational justification treats the other person as a tool rather than as a moral equal.

Why the other options don’t fit Kant: allowing deception for perceived societal benefit or privileging paternalistic judgments (therapeutic privilege) presupposes using people as means and undermines universal principles. Viewing consent as optional also clashes with the Kantian view that rational agents must be respected and informed in their autonomous decision-making.